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ABSTRACT
Despite the persistent fears that production abroad by U.S.multinationals reduces
employment at home, there has, in fact, been almost noaggregate shift of production or employment
to foreign countries. Some continuing shifts to foreign locationsby U.S. manufacturing firms have
been largely offset by shifts into the United Statesby foreign manufacturing multinationals.
An analysis of individual firm data indicates thathigher levels of production in developing
countries by a firm are associated with lower employment at home fora given level of production.
The reason is that U.S. multinationals tend to allocate theirmore labor-intensive production to
developing country affiliates and retain more capital-intensive and skill-intensiveoperations in the
United States.
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Introduction
There has long been a suspicion in the United States that investmentabroad by U.S. firms,
especially manufacturing firms, involves replacing U.S. workers by foreignworkers, with a
resulting loss of employment and decline in wages for the firms workers in the United States.
That suspicion was probably at its peak during the late 1960s and the1970s, and has declined
somewhat since then, but it still exists, Worries about the impact of outward FDIled to
Congressional proposals to restrict it and to administration measures to limit itsfinancing in the
United States.
The adverse effect on home labor was thought to occur throughtwo main channels. One
was the replacement of home production for the U.S. market by imports from the affiliates and
the other was the replacement of home production forexport by affiliate production in the host
countries. Since imports into the United States from manufacturing affiliates abroadwere
relatively small, most attention was focussed on export replacement. However, a series of studies
of export replacement failed to find evidence that it had takenplace. Most studies, including
parallel ones for Swedish firms, seemed to find that the net effect of affiliate productionon parent
exports was positive, if there was any effect at all. For the most part, these studies have found
*Thispaper was prepared for presentation at the SeventhInternationalConference of the Sorbomie, at the
University of Paris I Panthcon-Sorbonne, June 17-IS, 1999. Partial support for the paper was provided by the
Commissariat Général du Plan of France under Contract No. 4/1998. I am indebted for helpfulcomments on
the paper to Deborah Swenson, of the University of California-Davis, the discussant at t?ic Sorbonne
Conference, to other participants at that meeting, and to Johan Norbeck, of the Research Institute of Industrial
Economics, Stockholm, the discussant at a session of the Western Economic Association in July 1999. Iam
also indebted to Shachi Chopra-Nangia and Li Xu for skillful assistance inpreparing the paper.little or no effect or found that production abroad,on net balance, promoted parent exports and,
presumably, parent employment in the United States.
Much of the concern over outward NMarosefrom the impression that production and
employment abroad had been rising rapidly. That was the case from the 1950sthrough the
mid-1970s, but in the ten years after 1977, employment in foreign affiliates of U.S. firmsoutside
banking fell by almost a million. It has recovered since then, but did not reach the 1977 levelagain
until 1995. Most of this decline took place inmanufacturing affiliates, and the number of these
employees was still below the 1977 level in 1995.
It is clear from the data, as is demonstrated moreftilly below, that there has been no
aggregate shift of production or employment by U.S. multinationals out of the United States to
their foreign affiliates, at least in the last 20 or 25years. If there is any impact of foreign
operations by U.S. firms on U.S. labor markets, it must be through some different mechanism.
The issue we explore here is a different one. We take the level ofproduction by U.S.
multinationals in the United States as given, determined by each firm'sjudgment as to the optimal
geographical allocation of its worldwide production, We then ask whether thesegeographical
allocations affect the firms' home employment orwage levels by altering the labor intensity or the
skill intensity the firms' home production. They might doso if, for example, firms allocated their
most labor-intensive or least skill-intensive activities or products to their foreign affiliatesor to
their affiliates in low-wage countries.
Foreign direct investment, or FIN, is one vehicle by which production is allocatedamong
countries, or reallocated over time. The basic long-term forces behind these reallocationsare the
rising per capita incomes of home countries, which force their comparative advantagesup the
capital-intensity and skill-intensity scales, and the economic growth of foreign markets. For some
2countries, the depletion of a natural resource alterscomparative advantages. In other cases, major
changesin currency values induce investment abroad.Often, home country firmshaveacquired,
over a long time, firm-specific advantages in the industries thatare seen to beinevitablydeclining
athome.They may havebuilt uptechnological skills, marketing skills,networks of trade,and
brandnames that provide market access at home and abroad. In thatcase, these firms canretain
some of the rents on their firm-specific skills by FDI, establishingor acquiring production facilities
in the countries to which comparativeadvantages in production, or in parts of a production chain,
is migrating. Some familiar examples are U.S.petroleum industry firms that invested in crude
production abroad as the cost of U.S. petroleum resourcesincreased, and Swedish firms in the
forest products and forest product machinery industries.
These shiftsinthe location of production are presumably reflected in thecomposition of a
firm's home production. We wouldexpect that home production within a firm would shift away
from industries,or segments of industries, inwhich the home country was losing comparative
advantage. Thus, wewould expect thatU.S. firms with foreign production facilities would
allocate themorelabor-intensive segments of their production tolocationswhere labor,or
unskilledlabor, wasrelativelycheap. The result at home wouldbea shift toward more
capital-intensive or skill-intensive typesofproduction.
The data for the individual firmregressionsusedin thisstudyare from the confidential
individual firmresponsesto thebenchmarksurveyofU.S. direct investmentabroadin 1989
conducted by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the U.S.Department of Commerce.
The calculations hadtobe performed at the BEA to preserve the confidentiality of the responses.
3Have US. Firms Moved Their Production and Employment to Foreign Countries?
There are several ways to measure the importance of foreign production andemployment
by U.S. firms relative to economic activity at home. The two measures we use hereare
production, as represented by gross product, and employment. Activity abroad can becompared
with parent production and employment at home or with production andemployment in the whole
domestic U.S. economy. The comparison with parent activity describes the choices madeby the
multinational firms themselves and the comparison with the U.S. as a whole describes the
potential impact on the U.S economy. The gross product data for parents begin only in 1977,
after the major part of the expansion of overseas production, and are availableonly for benchmark
survey years until 1994. The gross product data for the MNCs foreign operations apply only to
majority-owned affiliates (MOFAs).
From 1977 to 1982 the share of foreign operations in theoutput of U.S. MINCs declined,
by more than 10 per cent. After that there was some recovery, to the point that the 1997 share
was almost identical to the 1977 level:
Gross Product of U.S. MOFAs as Per Cent of Gross Product







Source: Appendix Table 1.
4Over these 20 years, taken as a whole,U.S.MNCs seem to have increased home andforeign
production more or less in step with each other, without any substantial shift in or out of the
United States.
The comparison with production in the United States as a whole, asrepresented by Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) can be carried back to the earlier period of rapidgrowth in production
abroad by U.S. firms:









Source: Appendix Table 1.
We can describe this comparison as measuring the shift to foreign production by all U.S. firms,
including non-multinationals. After the large increase in the relative importance of overseas
production between 1966 and 1977, over 60 per cent, as compared with total U.S.
domestic output, the foreign share fell back for more than a decade, although not to its 1966
level. After 1989, MOFA production rose again, relative to total U.S. production, by more than
10 per cent, but in 1997 it still remained almost 20 per cent smaller relative to U.S. domestic
production than in 1977.
5
GD?, 1966-1997Employment has the advantage over production as ameasure of foreign and domestic
activity that it is not distorted by exchange rate changes, and lends itselfto examination of
absolute, as well as relative, movements. The number ofemployees of foreign affiliates of U.S.
MNCs grew by almost 3&1/2 million between 1957 and1977, more than doubling (Appendix
Table 2). After that, there was a reduction by almosta million foreign workers over the next
decade. That pullback was followed by arecovery that did not pass the 1977 ievel until 1995.
Over the whole 20 years since 1977, only about 800 thousandoverseas employees were added by
U.S. finns, a negligible number compared with theup to 40 million added by the U.S. economy as
a whole. However, parent firms increased their home employmentonly slightly; their employment
in 1997 was only a million more than in 1977, and their share oftotal U.S. employment dropped
from 21 to 15 per cent between 1977 and 1997. The MNCswere clearly occupying a different
universe from that of the United States as a whole.
The affiliate share of MNC employment, which we can observe only since thepeak in
1977, declined until the late 1980s, and then recovered, passing the 1977 level in 1995:
Employment in U.S. Affiliates Abroad









Source: Appendix Table 2
6Thus, within themultinationals,there was a small shift in the location of employment from the
United States to foreign locations.
Relative to the whole domestic U.S.economy, U.S. firms' affiliate employment has not
come near to returning to its 1977 levels:
Employment in U.S. Affiliates Abroad












Source: Appendix Table 2.
Alter growing by over SO per cent relative to total domestic U.S. employment between 1957 and
1977, foreign employment by U.S. firms then declined by over 30 per cent to a level not far above
that of 1957. The ratio began to rise again during the 1990s, but remained far below that of the
late 1970s.
7All in all, it seems safe to conclude that there has been no shift ofemployment in the
aggregate fromthedomestic U.S.economyto the foreign operations of U.S. firms.
Have U.S. Firms Moved TheirManufacturingProduction and Employment to Foreign Countries?
Since manufacturing and petroleum are much more important in the internationalized
output of U.S. firms than in domestic output, the internationalized shares of output are much
larger in these two sectors than in others. The share of the petroleum output of U. S. firms that is
produced abroad has increased greatly as U.S. domestic reserves of petroleum have declined or
become more expensive to exploit, relative to those abroad. In manufacturingtoo, the foreign
share of U.S. multinationals' production has risen even since 1977, theyear in which the share of
foreign production in general reached a peak and began to decline:
Gross Product of MOFA.S of U.S. Manufacturing Parents as Per Cent of








8In 1977, 21 per cent of the total output of U.S.manufacturing MNCs was produced outside the
United States, and that share had risen to 29per cent by 1997. Thus, U. S. manufacturing MNCs
have allocated more of their worldwideoutput to their foreign operations.
Since these MNCs are a large, though declining,part of U.S. manufacturing output, their
foreign production was large also relative to total U.S. manufacturingoutput.
Gross Product of MOFAs of U.S. Manufacturing MNCsas Per Cent of







Source: Appendix Table 3.
Since 1977, U.S. manufacturing finns production outside the United Stateshas increased from
17½ to 23 per cent of all manufacturing production in the U. S.,including that of non-
multinational and foreign owned firms.
Since 1977, the share of the MNC parent firms in U.S.manufacturing output has fallen
from 65 to 55 per cent. This does not mean that non-multinational firmsare taking over U.S.
manufacturing. Instead, the share of U.S. manufacturing affiliates of foreign multinational firms
has increased. Foreign-owned manufacturing affiliates in the UnitedStates, which produced only
3½ per cent of U.S. manufacturing output in 1977, accounted for 12&1/2per cent in 1997 (Zeile,
91999, and Appendix Table 3). Thus, both U.S. andforeign manufacturing firms were increasing
theirdegreeof internationalization- eachgroup was producing more in the other's home market.
AffiliateEmploymentof U.S. Manufacturing MNCsasPer Cent








Source: Appendix Table 4
The data on employment show that from 1977 through the 1980s. therewas essentially no
change in the share of foreign employment in the total employment of U.S.manufacturing MINCs.
Then the foreign share began to creepup during the 1990s, reaching 37 per cent in 1997. As can
be seen in Appendix Table 4, the number of employees outside the UnitedStates in 1997
remained below the 1977 level, but while foreign employment fellby about 250 thousand, the
parents' domestic employment fell by over 3 million.
The comparison with total manufacturing employment in the United Statescan be made
for a longer period, and puts the 1980s and 1.990s in a differentperspective:
10Employment in Foreign Affiliates of U.S. Manufacturing MNCs as











Source: Appendix Table 4
The move to overseas manufacturing employment took placemainly between 1957 and 1977,
when about 300 thousand foreign employees were added, almosttripling the number. Domestic
manufacturing employment was also rising during those two decades, by 2.6 million, so that the
growth of foreign employment was not a matter of reducing employment in the United States.
The absolute number of affiliate employees fell sharply in the decade after1977, by
something like 850 thousand, and the ratio to domestic U.S. manufacturing employment fell also.
Then, the number of foreign employees increased again, but in 1997 it remained below the 1977
level. Relative to domestic employment, foreign employment regained its earlier leveland, by
1997, was slightly above it.
While the extent of internationalization of U.S. manufacturing MNCswas about the same
in 1996 as in 1977, the parent share of U.S. manufacturingemployment has declined steadily,
from 60 per cent in 1977 to 46 per cent in 1997. Aswas the case for production, the parents'
place as employers was mostly taken by foreign manufacturing firms. Employment in U.S.
affiliates of foreign manufacturing firms jumped from 3&1/2per cent in 1977 to more thanl2 per
11cent in 1997 (Zeile, 1999, Table 8) Thus, U.S. andforeign manufacturing MNCs were both
internationalizing; each group increased its employment in the othergroup's region. In the U.S.
at least, the main result was a shift of manufacturingemployment from U.S. MNCs operating at
home to foreign MNCs operating in the United States.
The Geokranhjcal Ailocation of Production andEmployment
Even if there had been no major growth in the overallimportance of foreign production or
employment, there could have been geographical shifts that might have affected domestic labor
markets, such as an increase in the proportion of employment indeveloping, or low-wage,
countries. If we divide the affiliate locations roughly intodeveloped and developing, treating
Canada, Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand as developed,we find the following trend
Gross Product of MOFAs in Developed Countries







Source: Mataloni and Goldberg (1994), and Mataloni (1998) and (1999).
12Until the end of the 1980s, production by U.S. MOFAs was increasingly concentrated in
developed countries. After that, a small rise occurredinthe developing country share, but it still
remains less than a quarter of the worldwide total, a considerably smaller proportion than in 1977
and1982.
U.S. Affiliate Employment in Developed Countries









Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (1972?), (1981), Tables 11.G3 and III. G3;
(1985), Tables II.F3 and III.F3; (1992), Tables 11.G3 and IH.G3; and Mataloni
(1998) and (1999).
The developing countries' shares of U.S. firms' foreign employment are somewhat larger
than their shares of production, because output per worker is lower in developing countries than
in developed ones. The fluctuations in shares are muchsmaller,however, perhaps because the
influence of exchange rate changesiseliminated. The trend seems to be toward a larger share of
13employment in developing countries, especially in the I 990s, but most employment continues to
be in developed countries. The developing country share of MOFA employment rose from a little
under 30 per cent in 1966 to 34 per cent thirty years later, probably not enough for major effects
on U.S. labor markets.
On the whole, it does not appear that aggregate movements in the location of production
by U.S. MNCs have been of a type or size to have any major effects on U.S. labor markets as a
whole. If that is the case, the place to look for possible impacts may be within the individual firm,
rather than in aggregates of employment.
Parent Emoloyment in Individual Firms
Since the aggregate movements in production and employment, especially since 1977, do
not appear likely to have had major domestic labor market effects in the United States, we turn
next to studying possible impacts of overseas production on an individual firm's home
employment. Md since, as pointed out in the introduction, there are no indications from past
studies that foreign production by a U.S. firm reduces the firm's exports, and therefore its total
production, we look for possible impacts elsewhere. We ask whether, even given the total level
of production by a parent firm, its level of employment is affected by its choices about the
allocation of different types of production to its home and foreign operations. Two firms with the
same total parent firm (home) output might have different levels of home employment if they had
made different allocations of their worldwide production. For example, one firm may have placed
its labor-intensive operations abroad and retained only its capital-intensive operations at home
while the other firm either had no foreign operations or did have them but did not split production
between home and abroad by this criterion. The first firm would then have lower home
14employment for the same home production level. Mother possibility might be that one firm
places all the supervisory activity and research and marketing support for its worldwide
production at home while the other firm spreads them around to its production locations. In that
case, the first firm would have a higher level of home employment, given its home production.
A study for an earlier period (Lipsey, Dravis, and Roldan, 1982) found strong evidence
that capital intensities in US affiliates differed among locations in response to differences in factor
prices. Capital intensities were much higher in developed country affiliates than in those in
developing countries, where wages were far lower. That was true for affiliate aggregates within
industries, and remains true, according to the latest BEA survey (US Department of Commerce,
1998b).
It was also true among affiliates within individual US multinationals, and it was pointed
out that a positive relationship between the price of labor and the capital intensity of affiliate
production could represent several different phenomena. One is adaptation to factor price
differences by choosing different factor proportions along a single isoquant. Another is
adaptation by choosing different technologies to produce the same product in different countries.
A third is various types of allocation or, as described there, selection of products or sub-industries
from among those in the firm's repertoire.
Thefirsttwo explanations of the relationship would not imply any impact on an MNC's
home production, but the third one would, if the allocation included the firm's home country
operations. The earlier study could not distinguish among these alternative explanations because
home country operations were not covered, but they are included in this paper.
We examine this question here by running a set of regression equations in which parent
employment (PEMP) is related to parent production (PNS), proxied by parent net sales (sales
15minus imports from affiliates abroad) and affiliate production(ANS), proxied by affiliate net sales
(affiliatesales minus imports from the parent). We also have experimented with variants
separating different types of affiliates. The equations presented here for all affiliates are similar to
those for manufacturing alone in BlomstrOm, Fors, and Lipsey (1997), and in some respects to
those in Kravis and Lipsey (1988).
The first equation (with constant term suppressed, t-values in parentheses) suggests that
there is some allocation of labor-intensive activities to foreign operations, since the coefficient for
ANSisnegative.
(1) PEMP =5.55PNS(53.7) -lAOANS(8.9) RSQ(corr.) =.666No. Obs. 2,054
However, the same equation in log form gives the opposite result:
(2) Lii PEMP =867 Ln PNS (75.4) +020 Ln ANS(1 .9) RSQ (corr.) =.815No. Obs. =2,054
The log form gives a heavier weight to the differences at the lower end of the size scale, and the
difference in the signs of the coefficients suggests that the negative influence comes from the
largest affiliates. That suspicion is confirmed to some degree by arithmetic equations omitting the
150 largest affiliates, which produce positive, but only marginally significant, coefficients for
ANS.
If we divide parent firms into manufacturing and non-manufacturing parents, we find the
overall negative effect in both groups:
(3) MPEMP=5.95PNS(55 .8) -O.775ANS(5.56) RSQ(corr.).853 No. Obs,=1296
(4) INMPEMP=5 O3PNS(263)-I .446ANS(6.9) RSQ(corr.)=.495No. Ols.=759
Despite the emphasis on reallocation in manufacturing, the effect seems to be stronger in the non-
manufacturing sector. One problem is the heterogeneity of that sector. A major part of
16production there is in the Petroleum industry, which includes all activities of firms in that group,
whether they are in extraction, refining, transportation, or retailing.
If we separate affiliate net sales into those by manufacturing affiliates (ANSM) and those
by affiliates in non-manufacturing industries (ANSNM), the negative effect on home employment
appears, somewhat surprisingly, to be concentrated in the non-manufacturing affiliates.
(5)PEMP=5.52PNS(53.6) -0.37ANSM(1.7) -225 ANSNIM(7.2) RSQ(corr.)=.668
No. Obs.=2,054
However,if we examine manufacturing parents separately, it is clear that the negative coefficient
for non-manufacturing affiliates comes entirely from the non-manufacturing sector:
(6) MPEMP= 6.O2PNS(56.9)-1 .63ANSM(8 .2)+1 .66ANSNM(3 .9) RSQ(corr.)rz. 866
No. Obs.=1,295
Among manufacturing MNCs, the negative association is only with the sales of manufacturing
affiliates; higher sales by non-manufacturing affiliates are associated with higher home
employment. The allocation of labor-intensive activities to foreign affiliates by manufacturing
firms mainly involves manufacturing operations themselves.
If firms are reallocating production to take advantage of factor price differences, and in
particular, labor price differences, it would be reasonable to expect that production in developing
countries would reflect this motivation more than production in developed countries. Average
wages in developed country affiliates of manufacturing parents in 1989, the year of this cross-
section, were only 10 per cent below parent firm averages. Average wages in developing country
affiliates, however, were about 75 per cent below the parent level. It would therefore be to such
countries that production would be allocated for labor cost saving. We therefore test whether the
negative influence on parent employment, given parent production, comes mainly from production
17by affiliates in developingcountries(ANSLDC) or from production by affiliates in developed
countries (ANSDC).
(7) PEMP=5.46PNS(53 .8) +.472ANSDC(2.3)-] 0.1 ANSLDC(1 0.5)
RSQ (corr.)=.679 No.Obs.2.054
That expectation is strongly confirmed by equation 7. Production in developed countries adds to
parent employment per unit of home output while production in developing countries reduces it.
It should be noted that the log version of the equation does not suggest this type of
allocation of production.
(8) LnPEMP=.S49LnPNS(77. 1 )+03 6LnANSDC(6. 5)+ OO4LnANSLDC(0.9)
RSQ(corr.) =.818No. Ohs. =2,054
The log equation, giving heavier weight to the smaller affiliates, suggests that affiliate production
in developed countries adds to parent employment, given parent production, but that production
in developing countries has no effect on parent employment.
If we examine the impact separately for manufacturing and non-manufacturing parents, the
strong influence of the production in developing countries is evident:
(9) MPEMP=5.96IPNS(56. 1)-0.286DCANS(1 .31 )-4.8OoLDCANS(3 .47)
RSQ(corr.)=.864 No. Obs. 1296
(10) NIPs4PEMP=5.O2PNS(26.7)+. 1 85DCANS(0.5)-9.47LDCANS(5,9)
RSQ(corr.)=.511 No. Obs.759
Given the supposed non-tradability of many of the services included in the non-manufacturing
sector, the large negative coefficient for production in developing countries is surprising, because
the MNCs could not allocate production to developing countries for sale in developed countries.
However, if the petroleum industry is important in the results, the negative coefficient would be
18more understandable, although the motivation would in that case involve mainly resource costs
other than labor,Only adisaggregation of the non-manufacturing sector could answer this
question.
The ability of MNCs to allocate production in response to factor price differences might
be affected by host country characteristics, including trade policies. To test this possibility, we
divided developing countries into two groups, one we thought of as outward-oriented, and the
other inward- oriented. The former group includes Asian countries, except for India, and Mexico,
and the latter group includes other developing countries. The coefficients for sales by the two
groups were sharply different, despite the crudeness of the classification:
(11) MPEMP=6. 1 5PNS(54.7)+0.I 1ANSDC(0.5)+0.S6ANSLDCO(0.3)-23 .5OANSLDCI(1 0.2)
RSQ(corr.)=.876No. Obs.=1,296
All of the effects on parent employment appear to be associated with production in countries with
relatively inward-looking trade policy. Neither production in developed countries nor production
in outward-oriented developing countries affected home employment. These results raise the
possibility that some allocation in response to factor costs may be a consequence of production
location biased by host country rules.
Within manufacturing, it is possible to examine some of these relationships in several
major groups of industries. A listing of only the ANS coefficients from equations explaining
parent employment, given parent production, shows that negative coefficients, which we interpret
as indicating allocation by degree of capital intensity, are not ubiquitous.
19ANS t RSQ(corr.)
Foods -0.28 0.8 0.44
Chemicals -067 1.6 0.87
Metals -0.40 0.7 0.87
Non-Elect. Mach. 0.83 5.7 0.97
Elect, Mach. & Equip. 4.03 6.1 0.97
Transp. Equip. -7.53 26.5 0.99
In two major industries of U.S. manufacturing direct investment abroad, the two machinery
industries, the relationship of affiliate production to home employment is positive; more affiliate
production means more home employment, given the level of home production. Only in
Transport Equipment, mainly motor vehicles, is their strong evidence for the allocation of labor-
intensive production to affiliates.
If we characterize the affiliates by the distinctions made in Equatior 11, there is
considerably more evidence of effects on home employment in the various ANS coefficients:
DC LDC-Outward LDC-Inward RSQ(corr.)
Foods -7.87(2.8) 98.9(4.7) -96.4(3.2) .601
Chemicals-1.130.6) -16.0(3.2) 9.4(2.3) .873
Metals -7.29(4.9) 112.3(8.4) -11,0(2.8).890
Non-el. Mach. 0.68(4.0) 3.7(1.1) -12.8(2.1).969
ELMach.&Eq.6.70(5.4) 4.10.5) -15.1(3.5) .973
Transp. Eq.-8.07(13.1)-28.0(3.9) 9.6(3.2) .993
20For only one industry group, Foods, was the equation substantially improved by this breakdown
of affiliate locations. In three of the industry groups, Foods, Metals, and Transport Equipment,
the coefficients for developed country affiliate net sales are negative and significant, suggesting
some allocation of labor intensive activities to affiliates, but in the two machinery industries, the
coefficients are positive. Food industry affiliates are particularly oriented to their host country
markets, as are, to a smaller extent, affiliates in Chemicals and Metals, but those in the Transport
Equipment group are export-oriented, as are those in the two machinery groups. Thus, the
apparent allocation effect is not associated with export orientation, as we expected, but more with
orientation to local sales among these developed country affiliates, Transport Equipment being a
conspicuous exception.
Among developing country affiliates, the evidence for allocation of labor intensive
production is mainly in the countries classified here as inward-oriented, the exceptions being
Chemicals and Transport Equipment, where the affiliates in outward-oriented developing
countries showed the negative coefficients we associate with allocation by the MINCs. On the
whole, appears that it is the outward oriented industries and locations that require complementary
employment at home and the inward oriented ones that involve the allocation of labor-intensive
activities to affiliates.
In general, the coefficients for sales by developed country affiliates are smaller than those
for affiliates in developing countries. One reason may be that the wage differences between the
United States and many other developed countries were not large in 1989, and some developed
countries had higher nominal wages. The motivation for allocating labor-intensive production to
developed countries was therefore slight.
21A possible groundfor skepticismabout some of these coefficients is the fact that when
squared terms for affiliate sales are added to the equations, the coefficients for ANSchange
considerably. For example, in foods, both ANStermsturn positive while the squared terms are
negative and significant. The Chemicals equation is not affected much but the large positive
coefficient in Metals is much reduced and becomes insignificant, while the squared term is positive
and significant. In the two machinery industries, the terms for inward-oriented countries become
positive and significant. In fact, no significant negative term for ANS remains. It is difficult to
judge without access to the data, but the effects of including the squared terms suggests that the
results are heavily influenced by the largest affiliates. Taken literally, the coefficients could imply
that small affiliates tend to lead to higher home employment for supervisiofl or other headquarters
functions while large affiliates are used as locations for labor-intensive activities.
Affiliate Production and Parent Wage Levels
If foreign operations affect the labor intensity of a firm's home operations, they might also
affect the skill intensity of the parent firm. Again, there are at least two poisible avenues for such
effects. One is that low-skill operations may be allocated to foreign affiliates, particularly those in
developing countries, resulting in a higher skill mix, and presumably a higher average wage, at
home. The other avenue is that higher levels of foreign activity may require more staff at home
for supervision and financial oversight. In this case, both effects go in the same direction; more
foreign production should lead to higher wages at home.
Average parent wages increase with size of parent, as represented by parent net
sales(PNS). However, the effect does not appear to be linear, but declines as parent firms are
larger, and we therefore include in the equations a term for PNS squared:
22(12) PW= .055PNS(2.43)-.O1 IPNSSQ(3 .34)+.OS2ANS(2.78) RSQ(corr.)=.025
Not much of wage variation among parents is explained by this equation, but larger foreign
production is associated with higher average earnings, presumably from a higher average skill
level, at home.
To the extent that allocation of low-skill activities to low wage countries was an important
element of this effect, production in developing countries should have a greater impact than
production in developed countries:
(12) PW=.OSPNS(2. 17)-O.I IPNSSQ(3.33)+.O54ANSDC(1 .53)+.OO39ANSLDC(1.8 1)
RSQ(corr.)=.026.
If anything, production in developed countries seems to have a greater impact on parent wage
levels than production in developing countries, but neither coefficient is significant and too much
weight should not be placed on them. Similar equations with dummy variables for 3 digit
industries do not alter the results.
Wage equations for the individual industry groups produced few coefficients for affiliate
sales that were even marginally significant. In Chemicals and in the miscellaneous collection
called "Other manufacturing," coefficients for sales by developing country affiliates were a
positive influence on parent average wages, but the coefficients for the squared terms were
negative. In metals, the coefficient for production in affiliates in inward-oriented regions was
positive and significant.
The weak evidence we find on wages points to positive relations between affiliate
production and parent wage levels. However, there is hardly any evidence to support the idea
that allocation of low-skill operations to affiliates, rather than requirements for headquarters
services, is the crucial factor.
23Conclusions
There is no indication in aggregate data that movements of production from the United
States to foreign affiliates of U.S. firms have had any negative effect on employment by parent
firms or in the United States as a whole, at least in the last twenty years. Even if such movements
in production by U.S. MNCs could have that effect, they cannot explain recent labor force
developments because there has been almost no shift of production or employment by U.S. firms.
Some continued shifts to foreign locations have taken place in U.S. manufacturing firms, but these
have been offset by matching shifts into the United States on the part of foreign manufacturing
firms.
A regression analysis of individual firm data does point to some effects of foreign
production on employment within finns. Higher levels of affiliate production in developing
countries are associated with lower parent employment for any given level of parent production at
home. The allocation by MNCs of the more labor-intensive segments of their production to their
developing country affiliates and the more capital-intensive segments to their home operations
reduces the labor intensity of their home production and thus their demand for labor for any given
level of home production. There is only weak evidence for a wage or skill effect. If there is any
effects it is that foreign operations are associated with higher wages at home.
We do provide at least a partial answer to the question raised in an earlier paper by Lipsey,
Kravis, and Roldan (1982). That is whether the low capital intensities of affiliates in developing
countries involve simply responses to low labor costs by changing factor porportions for identical
products or processes. The answer here is that at least some of the reason for low capital
intensities is the MNCs' choice of which products to produce in low wage countries.
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28Appendix Table
Gross Product of Nonbanic U.S. Multinational Firms and U.S.GDP
Parents and MOFAsParents MOFAs US GDP
$
1966 n.a. n.a. 36,752 787.8
1970 na. na. 54,720 1,035.6
1977 651,665 490,529 161,136 2,026.9
1982 1,019,734 796,017 223,717 3,242.1
1983 na. na. 216,683 3,514.5
1984 n.a. n.a. 220,331 3,902.4
1985 na. na. 220,074 4,180.7
1986 n.a. n.a. 231,644 4,422.2
1987 na. na. 269,734 4,692.3
1988 n.a. n.a. 297,556 5,049.6
1989 1,364,878 1,044,884 319,994 5,438.7
1990 n.a. na. 356,033 5,743.8
1991 n.a. n.a. 355,963 5,916.7
1992 na. n.a. 361,524 6,244.4
1993 n.a. n.a. 359,179 6,558.1
1994 1,717,488 1,313,792 403,696 6,947.0
1995 1,831,046 1,365,470 465,576 7,269.6
1996 1,978,948 1,480,638 498,310 7,661.6
1997 2,089,796 1,570,490 519,306
Sources:Howenstirie (1977), Table 1, Lipsey, Blomström, and Ramstetter (1998),
Table 1, Mataloni and Goldberg (1994), Mataloni (1998), Seskin (1998),
Table 1, and Mataloni (1999), Table 1, and U.S. Department of Commerce
(1999), Table 1.1.
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Sources: Lipsey (1989), Mataloni (1992), (1998) and (1999),
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30Appendix Table 3
Gross Product of U.S. Multinational Manufacturing Firms









462.6 1977 382,280 301,286 80,994
1982 542,689 421,050 121,639 649.8
1989 793,771 586,568 207,203 1,013.5
1995 1,023,697 723,182 300,515 1,282.2
1996 1,071,324 764,725 306,599 1,309.1
1997 1,080,824 765,122 3]5,702
Sources: Lum and Yuskavage (1997), Mataloni and Goldberg (1994), Mataloni
(1999), and U.S. Department of Commerce (1999), Table B. 3.
(1998) and
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Parents and Parents and & Full Time
All Affiliates MOFAs Parents All Affiliates MOFAs Employment in
by Industry of by Industry of by Industry of by Industry of
ParentAffiliateParentAffiliate ParentAffiliateParentAffiliate
Manufacturinga
1957 (l,846)'1,700 17,009 1966 (3,654)c 2,615 19,138
1977 16,630 15,54811,775(5,272)b4,855 3,773 19,601
198215,34714,96614,24713,89010,5334,814 4,4333,7143,358 18,750 198315,10414,723 13,69410,4934,611 4,230 3,201 18,366
198415,35015,030 13,90610,660 4,689 4,370 3,245 19,329
198515,19414,852 13,70510,503 4,692 4,349 3,202 19,207
198614,84914,552 13,52310,431 4,418 4,121 3,092 18,901
198714,606 14,314 13,226 10,196 4,410 4,118 3,030 18,951
198814,292 13,964 12,878 9,820 4,473 4,144 3,058 19,321
198914,64014,318 13,791 13,374 10,127 4,513 4,191 3,664 3,247 19,365
1990 14,13813,45813,182 9,805(4,586)" 4,333 3,741 3,377 18,984
1991 13,773 13,293 12,814 9,514 (4,612)" 4,259 3,779 3,300 18,374
1992 13,25513,01212,515 9,246(4,575)J4,009 3,766 3,269 18,023
1993 12,99912,68412,245 9,019 (4,430)" 3,980 3,6643,226 18,025
199413,69213,31312,90812,565 9,049 4,643 4,263 3,8583,516 18,281
199513,81113,42313,22412,685 9,080(4,731)c4,3444.1443,606 18,448
199613,745 13,35313,04412,626 8,960(4.78Sf 4,393 4,084 3,666 18,436
199713,62513,21612,843 12,503 8,623 (5,002)t 4,593 4,220 3,880 18,621
aExcludthg Petroleumand CoalProducts
bExtrapolated from1982byemployment byindustry ofaffiliate
°Extrapolatedfrom 1977 by MOFA employment by industry of affiliate
djiiten,olats between 1989 and 1994 by employment by industry of affiliate
txtrapolated from 1994 by employment by industry of affiliate
Source: Lowe and Mataloni (1991), Mataloni (1992) (1993), (1994) (1995), (1996), (1997), (1998)and(1999);
Mataloni and Fahim-Nader (1996); Seskin (1998); U.S. Department of Commerce (1999), Table B. 8; and
Whichard (1989).
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